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The purpose of this study is to determine if occupational licensing affects the state 
in which veterans choose to live after separating from the military. Veterans receive 
specialized training while in the military, which has the potential to translate easily into 
civilian occupations. States that mandate licensing requirements for occupations, however, 
may act as barriers that prevent veterans from easily entering occupations for which they 
have received military training, causing unnecessary market inefficiencies. 
Occupational licensing has historically resulted in increased wages for workers in 
those occupations, and this study empirically confirms this trend, utilizing data regressions 
of veterans in the census. Additionally, as this study examines a sample composed entirely 
of veterans, I am able to compare multivariate relationships of our veteran sample to those 
of previous civilian samples.  
As this field is fairly narrow, and relatively new, there are numerous opportunities 
to further develop these relationships in future studies. New data collection from outside 
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The military spends a considerable amount of money training individuals in specific 
fields. Whether they are medics, electricians, or mechanics, the taxpayers are investing 
money into enhancing these individuals’ industry-specific capital. Occupational licensing 
requirements prevent these service members from easily transferring the skills they have 
acquired in the military into the civilian labor market once they separate from the military. 
These veterans must then choose to enter an unlicensed occupation or fulfill the additional 
requirements necessary for them to practice their trade in a specific state. If the veteran 
chooses to enter an unlicensed occupation, he is not utilizing the training that the taxpayers 
have provided. Should the veteran decide to fulfil the additional requirements in order to 
enter the licensed occupation, he is wasting his time and/or money to work in a field that 
for which he is already at least partially trained. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Occupational licensing is generally regarded as a market inefficiency. By imposing 
unnecessary requirements upon workers entering a particular industry, licensing 
committees are able to artificially manipulate labor supply for their industry, thereby 
reducing supply and increasing wages for workers already in that industry. Licensing is 
typically practiced with the intention of imposing a quality threshold for an industry, in 
order to “protect” the public from incompetent workers. In time, however, due to the free 
market, these workers would eventually be forced to exit the industry. Due to the poor 
quality, incompetent workers and firms would be noted by consumers, who would reduce 
consumption of these services until those firms go out of business. Additionally, 
considering price discrimination, there are consumers who specifically intend on 
consuming lower-quality services for lower prices. When licensing committees eliminate 
these service providers, the prospective consumers of lower-quality services are either 
forced to pay more for higher-quality services, forego the services, or attempt to procure 
services outside of the market. 
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C. METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS 
In this study, I use multivariate analysis to explore the relationships present within 
a sample of military veterans, collected by the census. My focus is to highlight the 
relationships involving wage, occupational licensing status, and veteran’s state of 
residence, in an attempt to explain whether occupational licensing status affects where a 
veteran chooses to live after separating from the military. Additionally, by highlighting 
wage statistics, I am able to compare our data sample to previous studies, which have 
analyzed similar statistics for civilian samples. 
I find that veterans experience increased wages in licensed occupations, often 
referred to as a “wage premium.” The concept of a wage premium associated with licensed 
occupations is in keeping with both economic theory and previous research regarding 
civilians who work in licensed occupations. By grouping our veteran sample by 
occupational categories, I find that there is a large variation in the manner that licensing 
affects wages for different occupational groups. Some groups experience large wage 
premiums, while other groups experience smaller wage penalties. Finally, by regressing 
licensing status and state of residence, I find that there are approximately two veterans 




A. OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING IN THE CIVILIAN MARKET 
According to Gittleman and Kleiner, “In 2003, the Council of State Governments 
estimated that more than 800 occupations were licensed in at least one state, and more 
than 1,100 occupations were licensed, certified, or registered” (2013, p. 6). While these 
terms are often used interchangeably, they use the following definitions to distinguish 
these forms of occupational regulation. Registration is the least restrictive, involving an 
individual submitting their name and relevant information to an agency for filing. 
Certification requires an individual to complete an examination and/or schooling, attesting 
to the fact that the individual has acquired the requisite skills required to work in their field. 
Licensure is the strictest form of occupational regulation, and the individual is legally 
prohibited from working in a licensure-required industry prior to obtaining one (Gittleman 
& Kleiner, 2013). Occupational regulations are typically regarded as a method to prevent 
low-quality service providers from negatively affecting a particular industry, or the 
members of the public who consume its services. By imposing certain restrictions on 
prospective labor entering the market, whether it is in the form of fees, education, or 
standardized testing, the licensing committee chooses to impose a type of standard on labor 
providers, theoretically improving the quality of service in an industry.  
In practice, however, as the licensure board is generally composed of individuals 
already in the given profession, they have ample opportunity to heavily regulate the 
industry after they have secured their own position in the market. Imposing additional 
restrictions in this fashion then adds additional barriers for new entrants, thereby reducing 
market supply of labor, leading to an artificial increase in wages (Kleiner, 2000). These 
restrictions come in the form of additional fines, additional schooling, or stricter “pass 
rates” on qualification tests, and are all examples of additional barriers to entry. By 
regulating the supply of new entrants, occupational licensing boards can in theory capture 
more economic rents in the labor market. Gittleman and Kleiner discuss the ultimate effects 
of occupational licensing: “seekers of high-quality services gain by regulation and seekers 
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of low-quality services are worse off because prices are higher and choices more limited” 
(Gittleman & Kleiner, 2013, p. 8).  
In fact, Wiswall (2007) argues that in some instances, occupational licensing can 
even be detrimental to the industry as a whole. For instance, suppose higher amounts of 
general human capital lead to more proficient teachers. However, additional investment 
into licensing requirements for teaching is considered to be industry-specific, rather than 
general human capital, and cannot be transferred readily into non-teaching occupations. 
Therefore, prospective teachers will forego investments in general human capital for 
additional investment in industry specific capital, leading to a decrease in the overall 
quality of teachers in the industry.  
Teaching is also an attractive industry to analyze as, in more recent years, the 
number of license-waivered teachers has increased, facilitating comparison between the 
quality of output between licensed and non-licensed teachers. Research into this area is 
currently inconclusive; some research has determined that licenses do not affect education 
outcomes and student quality, while other research has shown that there is a correlation 
between teacher license status and student performance. However, these relationships are 
not necessarily causal, as there is heavy self-selection bias as to which potential entrants 
decide to become licensed teachers. 
In order to more accurately determine the effects of occupational licensing on the 
labor market, Kleiner and Krueger analyzed a 2008 survey conducted by Westat, a 
statistical survey company (2009). Initially, 2,513 individuals were surveyed; however, the 
final response rate and completion percentage was approximately 17.9 percent. While such 
a low participation rate is potentially worrisome, the authors do not believe that 
occupational licensing is strongly associated with the probability of completing the survey 
in question. From analysis of the data, they determined that licensing rates typically rise 
with education and with union membership, and do not typically vary with race or gender. 
The authors also estimated a regression with licensing as the independent variable and log 
wages as the dependent variable. With only standard control variables, such as age, 
education, union membership, gender, work experience, and race, the licensing coefficient 
is determined to be 0.139. With occupational controls, the coefficient falls to 0.119. The 
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coefficient estimates thus indicate that being licensed is associated with twelve to fourteen 
percent higher income. This result is consistent with the above assertion that the restriction 
of labor supply due to licensure regulations results in an increased wage for workers in the 
licensed industry. 
Gittleman and Kleiner (2013) also utilized multivariate analysis to study the effects 
of occupational licensing on the labor market. They use data from the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1970 (NLSY79), whose respondents are between 14 and 22 
in 1979 and were surveyed annually from 1979 to 1994, and biennially from 1994 to 2010. 
Unfortunately, the survey did not include whether the individuals’ current occupations 
were licensed, so the authors were required to bridge occupation and state of residence with 
a state occupational licensure list.  
While not explicitly apparent, there is concern for the presence of omitted variables 
bias within the sample used by Gittleman and Kleiner. Individuals who are more likely to 
enter an occupation that is licensed are also more likely to earn more, with other 
circumstances being equal. In order to attempt to control for this omitted variables bias, the 
authors employ five techniques. The first is to run a standard regression, in order to 
compare their results to past results. Secondly, they utilize the Armed Services Vocational 
Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) scores as a proxy for ability. The third and fourth methods 
involve utilizing the structure of the NLSY79 data set to compare wage growth in 
individuals moving in or out of a licensed occupation. Finally, the authors utilize a fixed-
effects approach in order to attempt to control for individual ability. Upon analyzing the 
data set, the authors observe that licensed individuals tend to be older, have more education, 
are more likely to be in a union, more likely to be female, and are somewhat less likely to 
be African-American. While not identical to the study conducted by Kleiner and Krueger, 
they are fairly consistent.  
After running a simple regression of licensure on log wage, the authors obtain a 
licensing coefficient of 0.281 log points. Upon adding controls for education, experience, 
state, year, and demographic variables, the licensing coefficient falls to 0.123 log points, 
which is similar to the results obtained by Kleiner and Krueger. When the authors add 
major occupation dummies to the regression, however, this coefficient falls to 0.078 log 
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points. The authors explain that the sample is extremely heterogeneous, so there is a 
possibility that the regression compares licensed and unlicensed individuals from different 
industries; for example, “licensed electricians to unlicensed plumbers” (Gittleman & 
Kleiner, 2013, p. 18). 
The effects of occupational licensing are typically compared to the effects of 
unionization. Both unionization and occupational licensing typically result in higher wages 
for market labor suppliers, however, the wage increase is for distinctly different reasons. 
As discussed above, the wage increase for licensed occupations is typically due to 
regulation decreasing the supply of market labor. Wage increases due to unionization are 
typically attributed to the collective labor supply organizing and bargaining for higher 
wages. Additionally, according to Kleiner (2000), wage differentials to due occupational 
licensing are considerably more visible for occupations with higher base wages, such as 
dentists, and less visible for occupations such as cosmetologists and barbers. 
In summary, occupational licensing is an inefficiency on the labor market, leading 
to artificially increased wages, decreased labor supply, and in some cases, decreased labor 
quality. Both studies, conducted by Gittleman and Kleiner, and Kleiner and Krueger, 
experimentally experience wage premiums for workers in licensed occupations. 
B. OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING WITH RESPECT TO MILITARY 
VETERANS 
In contrast, little to no academic research has been conducted in regards to 
occupational licensing and military veterans. A large focus of public concern and some 
research has been on occupational regulations and military spouses. As military spouses 
are required to move frequently across state lines, those in licensed occupations typically 
face considerable difficulties maintaining employment in their chosen occupation. 
According to a 2012 report by the Department of Treasury and Department of Defense, 
almost thirty-five percent of military spouses work in licensed occupations and they are ten 
times as likely as the average American to move from state-to-state (p. 3). This report 
analyzed a sample of approximately 2,800 military spouses from 2007 to 2011. 
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The report hones in on the requirements to obtain a nursing certification, in 
particular, and the requirements to transfer that nursing certification across states. While 
some mechanisms exist for this purpose, such as a temporary license that allows the nurse 
to practice while awaiting review and transfer of his or her permanent license, these 
mechanisms can still be costly and time-consuming. The report then describes additional 
mechanisms that can increase the portability of state occupational licenses, such as 
licensure by endorsement, temporary or provisional licensing, and expedited application 
processes. 
Additionally, a 2012 report published by the Executive Office of the President 
underscores the importance of streamlining the transition of military veterans to the civilian 
market. There are some programs created for this purpose, for instance, the Army and Navy 
have developed Credentialing Opportunities On-Line (COOL) to enable military service 
members to achieve civilian credentialing while still participating in their relevant military 
career. In an effort to continue pursuing related possibilities for service members, the 
Obama administration created the Military Credentialing and Licensing Task Force 
(MCLTF). 
In addition to the MCLTF, the Obama administration implemented other policies 
to better enable military service members to transition to the civilian sector, such as 
rewarding employers who hired veterans with additional tax credits, issuing a challenge to 
the private sector to hire military veterans, and facilitating additional government hiring of 
veterans and veteran entrepreneurship. Unfortunately, since former President Obama 
exited the office, information and activities of the MCLTF task force have diminished. 
While literature does exist regarding occupational licensing—and, in some ways, 
how licensing impacts military veterans—there is potential for further research in this field. 
Analyzing occupational licensing and how it affects the civilian market provides a general 
understanding as well as basis for comparison regarding how occupational licensing affects 
military veterans. Additionally, while some avenues are provided for military veterans 
transitioning to the civilian labor market, there are opportunities to further ease the 
transition, in order to reduce the amount of loss of veteran resources and taxpayer dollars. 
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III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A. DATA 
In order to estimate the relationship between a veteran’s state of residence and the 
state’s occupational stringency, I use data obtained from the Integrated Public Use 
Microdata Series (IPUMS) database. This database compiles census microdata—that is to 
say, each observation represents a specific individual with encoded characteristics, rather 
than an aggregated number of random observations. However, as the IPUMS data do not 
keep record of military occupation or training history, I am unable to prove that veterans 
do or do not enter licensed occupations that the military has trained them for. Although 
estimating a causal relationship with my current data set is impossible, comparing Figure 1 
and Figure 2 allows a simple view into a state’s mean occupational licensing level and the 
percentage of veterans who choose to live in a particular state. The District of Columbia is 
not included in this graph, as it is not technically a state, although it does specify 
occupational licensing requirements similar to a state. 
Figure 1 illustrates the proportion of veterans who work in licensed occupations by 
state. As noted by the darkest red, the states with the highest proportion of veterans that 
work in licensed occupations are Washington, Montana, New Mexico, Michigan, 
Tennessee, Florida, and Connecticut, and Alaska. Figure 2 illustrates veterans living in a 
particular state, organized as a proportion of the veterans contained in the IPUMS database 
sample. The states with the highest amounts of veterans are California, Texas, Florida, 
Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, and Virginia.  
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Data obtained from the IPUMS database. 
Figure 1.  Proportion of Veterans Who Work in Licensed Occupations, by State 
 
Data obtained from the IPUMS database. 
















The only state present in both categories, highest proportion of licensed veterans 
and highest proportion of veteran residence, is Florida. Of the remaining states with the 
highest veteran proportion, Pennsylvania is in the category with the lowest proportion of 
veterans working in licensed occupations, Texas is in the next to lowest category, Ohio, 
Virginia, and Pennsylvania are in the third lowest category, and California and Illinois are 
in the second highest category. Excluding Florida, the other states with the highest 
proportions of veterans working in licensed occupations are Washington, Montana, New 
Mexico, Michigan, Tennessee, Connecticut, and Alaska. Montana is in the lowest category 
of veteran residence proportion, New Mexico is in the second to lowest, Connecticut and 
Washington are in the third to lowest, and Michigan and Tennessee are in the second 
highest categories. While I am unable to simply conclude any pattern by comparing these 
two graphs, I am also able to conclude that veterans working in licensed occupations and 
veteran distribution are not easily correlated by state. 
Figure 3 is a graphical representation of the number of occupations in each state 
that require a license, using standard occupational codes (SOCs), which were codified in 
2002. By using the number of licensed occupations in a state as a proxy for state licensing 
stringency, I am able to compare veteran geographic distribution to state licensing 
stringency by comparing Figure 2 to Figure 3. Of the states with the highest proportion of 
veteran residence, California and Pennsylvania are in the second highest category for 
occupational stringency, Illinois is in the third highest, New York and Florida are in the 
third to lowest, Ohio and Virginia are in the second to lowest, and Texas is in the lowest 
category for occupational stringency. Again, there are no readily discernable patterns in 
comparing these two figures, making a multivariate analysis of these data necessary. 
Additionally, the width of this category ranges from approximately 3.5 percent to 9 percent, 
which is significantly more range than the other categories displayed by the graph. 
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Data obtained from the IPUMS database. 
Figure 3.  Occupations Requiring a License, by State 
The sample data contains 2,584,577 military veterans obtained from the IPUMS 
database, collected through the U.S. census. The pertinent variables recorded in the sample 
are year, region, state, age, gender, marital status, race, education, occupational licensing 
status, hours worked, and wage. I cleaned and encoded most of these variables into binary 
dummy variables representing race, geographic area, education and employment in a 










Table 1.   Variable Distribution 
Variable Mean Std Dev Median Min Max 
Year 1999.06 7.65 2000 1990 2012 
Age 47.58 10.91 49 18 65 
Weeks Worked 48.25 9.68 52 0 52 
Black 0.09 0.28 - 0 1 
Asian 0.01 0.11 - 0 1 
Female 0.06 0.24 - 0 1 
Married 0.74 0.44 - 0 1 
North East 0.17 0.38 - 0 1 
Midwest 0.24 0.42 - 0 1 
South 0.37 0.48 - 0 1 
West 0.22 0.41 - 0 1 
Less Than HS 0.07 0.26 - 0 1 
HS Graduate 0.31 0.46 - 0 1 
Some College 0.37 0.48 - 0 1 
Postgraduate 0.1 0.3 - 0 1 
Weekly Wage 858.05 1275.9 671.43 0 339000 
Log Weekly 
Wage 6.52 0.79 6.55 -3.95 12.73 
Occupational 
Licensing 0.16 0.37 - 0 1 
Data obtained from the IPUMS database. 
 
B. METHODOLOGY 
My sample data is composed strictly of veteran observations, and therefore the 
relationships I have discovered through regression analysis should only be considered 
when referencing veterans. 
In order to discern the nature of the multivariate relationship between a veteran’s 
state of residence and occupational licensing requirements in the state, I first estimate 
regression equations attempting to explain wage as a function of licensing status, in order 
to compare the results and data sets to those obtained from previous research. For this 
purpose, I analyze the equation 
 ln(wage)= β0 + β1occupational license + μ.. 
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This equation allows me a baseline with which to compare research discussed in the 
literature review, with no controls such as demographic data or educational proxies. Next, 
I add controls to more accurately determine the effects of occupational licensing on wage, 
by adding variables discussed above. The regression equation is represented by  
ln(wage) = β0 + β1occupational license + β2year + β3black + β4asian + β5female + 
β6married + β7North East + β8Mid-West + β9South + β10West + β11Less than High 
school Education + β12Highschool Graduate + β13Some College + β14College Graduate 
+ β15Postgraduate Education + β16Age + β17Age2 + μ.. 
 
As a majority of these control variables are binary, there is less of a tendency for 
the explanatory variable, occupational licensing, to become “washed out” by too many 
control variables in the equation. After comparing the regression coefficient results to 
previous research, I quantify the relationship between state of residence and occupational 
licensing status, simplified to 
 state = β0 + β1occupational license + μ.. 
 
This regression equation allows us to quantify the correlation between veteran state of 
residence and whether the veteran works in a licensed occupation or not. The equation does 
not, however, allow us to identify any causal relationship between the two variables. I am 
only able to specify that a relationship does or does not clearly exist, not that occupational 





A. WAGE PREMIUM 
I discovered three main findings through my regression analyses. The first is that 
on average, veterans experience a wage premium by working in licensed occupations. The 
second is that there is substantial heterogeneity in licensing premiums, when veterans are 
organized by occupation. Finally, there is a correlation between occupational licensing 
status and veteran state of residence. For the sake of exposition, I limit the tables and 
discussion below to licensing coefficients. The full set of regression results are reported in 
the Appendix. 
The first finding is that on average, veterans are observed to obtain a wage premium 
by working in licensed occupations. The relationship between occupational licensing and 
earnings as measured by log weekly wage are reported in Table 2. Without conditioning 
on any control variables, the licensing coefficient yields a 0.237 significant increase in log 
weekly wage. This indicates that on average, veterans who worked in licensed occupations 
earn 23.7% higher wages than veterans in unregulated occupations.  
Table 2.   Wage Premium 
lwklywage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
occ_license 0.237*** 0.0967*** 0.0961*** 0.0928*** 0.0940*** 0.0925*** 
Std Error -0.00145 -0.00213 -0.00211 -0.00237 -0.00239 -0.00239 
Demographic No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls 
Year FE No No Yes Yes Yes No 
Industry FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
State FE No No No No Yes No 




Moving across columns in Table 2 while controlling for various factors, we see that 
the licensing coefficient remains statistically significantly larger than zero. In particular, 
including standard demographic controls and proxies for human capital as outlined in the 
previous chapter, the licensing coefficient falls to 0.0967; further controlling for industry 
fixed effects drops the occupational licensing coefficient to 0.0925. In other words, a 
veteran in a licensed occupation earns on average 9% higher wages than a similar veteran 
in an unlicensed occupation, even conditional on the two of them working in the same 
industry and holding constant all other factors relating to their human capital and 
demographic characteristics (such as age, gender, and education). 
For comparison, Kleiner and Krueger (2009) found an occupational licensing 
coefficient of 0.139 with demographic controls and 0.119 with occupational controls. 
Comparing the results obtained by Kleiner and Krueger with the results I obtained, there is 
a 0.0423 difference between the occupational licensing coefficients with demographic 
controls, and a .0265 difference between coefficients with occupational/industry controls. 
This indicates that veterans’ wage premiums obtained by working in licensed occupations 
are, on average, approximately 4% lower with demographic controls and 2.5% lower with 
occupational controls than their civilian counterparts. Additionally, the coefficients 
obtained by Gittleman and Kleiner (2013) using the NLSY79 sample were 0.281 log points 
when regressing occupational licensing on log wage, 0.123 points upon the addition of 
demographic controls, and 0.078 log points on the inclusion of occupational controls. The 
differences between the coefficients I obtained and the coefficients Gittleman and Kleiner 
found are 0.044, 0.0263, and 0.0145 for no controls, demographic controls, and 
occupational controls, respectively, indicating that on average, veterans earn 4.4% less, 
2.63% less, and 1.45% more than their civilian counterparts by working in licensed 
occupations. 
Overall, the small differences between licensing coefficients suggests that our 
sample may not be drastically different from the samples used by Kleiner and Krueger, and 
by Gittleman and Kleiner in their studies. On the other hand, the consistently lower wage 
premium for licensing among the veteran population compared to civilians indicates that 
on average, veterans tend to make less money by working in licensed occupations than 
 17 
civilians working in the same licensed occupations. Additionally, all the regressions, both 
from our study as well as those mentioned in our Literature Review, estimate positive and 
statistically significant licensing coefficients, illustrating that for all three samples, there 
exists a wage premium associated with being occupationally licensed. This notion 
empirically confirms the principle discussed in our Literature Review: occupational 
licensing ultimately results in a wage premium for workers in those licensed occupations.  
B. OCCUPATIONAL VARIATION 
However, the licensing coefficient reflects a wide variation of distinct occupations 
contained within the sample. Even with industry fixed effects, in order to better represent 
the ways in which the licensing coefficient have heterogeneous effects across occupations, 
I separate the industries into the major categories presented by the IPUMS codebook. These 
categories are managers, technical, sales, and administrative occupations, service 
occupations, production crafting and repair occupations, and operators, fabricators, and 
laborers. The impact of licensing categories on log weekly wage, with only demographic 
controls, are summarized in Table 3. There is a wide variation in licensing coefficients, 
from 0.280 for service occupations to -0.0927 for operators, fabricators and laborers. 
Broadly generalized, in our sample, it appears that white-collar jobs have larger positive 
licensing premiums, compared to blue-collar occupations. This relationship differs from 
the expected effects of unionization, in which those in blue-collar jobs tend to benefit more 
from the effects of unionization than white-collar occupations.  













occ_license 0.0290*** 0.0808*** 0.280*** 0.00265 -0.0927*** 
Std Error (0.00321) (0.00662) (0.00489) (0.00492) (0.00842) 
Demographic 
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Data obtained from the IPUMS database. 
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It is important to remember that my sample is not comprised of a normal cross-
section of average U.S. citizens. Every observation in my sample is a military veteran, so 
the relationships I determine through my analysis may not be applicable to general U.S. 
society. Additionally, as this is a veteran sample, I highlight some occupations that have 
the possibility to transfer more easily into the civilian sector. In Table 4, I explore the 
relationships between some of the occupations that I believe may translate well from the 
military to civilian sectors of the market. These occupations are those in the health industry, 
i.e., doctors, dentists, therapists, etc., health technicians, i.e., nurses, engineering 
technicians, and mechanics. The veterans in these occupations have received specialized 
training, and in theory, could transition to a similar civilian occupation. Occupations in the 
health and mechanic industries exhibit high licensing coefficients, 0.197 and 0.141, 
respectively, while health and engineering technicians present much lower licensing 
coefficients, -0.0645 and -0.0931, respectively. This suggests that for some occupations 
they have been trained for, veterans may benefit from higher wage premiums due to 
licensing, however, in other occupations that veterans may have been trained for, they 
experience lower wages due to licensing. 
Table 4.   Specified Occupation Categories 
 
Occupation 




Code 84-106 203-208 213-208 505-519 
occ_license 0.197*** -0.0645*** -0.0931*** 0.141*** 
Std Error (0.0196) (0.0128) (0.0174) (0.0131) 
Demographic 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Finally, in an effort to determine how occupational licensing affects the state in 
which veterans choose to live after separating from the military, I analyze our final 
regression which, holding year constant, describes the effect of concentration of veterans 
across states on occupations, categorized in licensed versus unlicensed occupations. The 
coefficient from this regression is 1.998, indicating that on average, there are roughly two 
veterans in licensed occupations per state for every one veteran that works in an unlicensed 
occupation. The data does not support drawing a causal relationship between state 
residence and occupational licensing status, but as a correlative statistic, it is interesting to 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The three main findings of our analysis of the data present three relationships: 
workers in licensed occupations experience a wage premium, on average, veterans 
experience a lower wage premium than their civilian counterparts, and that there are 
roughly twice as many veterans in licensed occupations versus unlicensed occupations per 
state. We expect to experience a wage premium for veterans in licensed occupations, as 
this factor is in keeping with prior research. However, our second and third findings present 
new and statistically interesting relationships. There are no obvious reasons that a veteran 
should make less money than a civilian in the same licensed occupation, other than perhaps 
less job experience. While these relationships are statistically significant, due to the nature 
of our data set, asserting that any of these findings are causal in nature would be statistically 
irresponsible. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
However, as little research currently exists on this subject, there are great 
opportunities to further develop this topic. Specifically, the MCLTF began to develop 
important studies regarding the transferability of military training into licensed civilian 
occupations. However, as the task force has not been reestablished by the current 
presidential administration, research that could benefit a large proportion of our military 
veterans has yet to be reinstituted. Therefore, we recommend that the current 
administration further develop this or a similar task force, in order to ensure military 
training is being utilized in the most efficient manor for our veterans.  
In addition to the reimplementation of a task force dedicated to optimizing the 
impact of military training on the civilian labor market, we recommend that organizations 
such as the Defense Military Data Center and the Department of Veterans Affairs record 
data that would facilitate further studies in this area, specifically, recording current veteran 
occupation would greatly benefit future studies.  
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occ_license 0.237*** 0.0967*** 0.0961*** 0.0928*** 0.0928*** 0.0940*** 
 (0.00145) (0.00213) (0.00211) (0.00237) (0.00237) (0.00239) 
age   0.0863*** 0.0724*** 0.0724*** 0.0729*** 
   (0.000582) (0.000634) (0.000634) (0.000633) 
age2   -0.000907*** -0.000745*** -0.000745*** -0.000752*** 
   (6.43e-06) (6.98e-06) (6.98e-06) (6.96e-06) 
black   -0.116*** -0.0983*** -0.0983*** -0.122*** 
   (0.00264) (0.00276) (0.00276) (0.00278) 
asian   -0.0323*** -0.0399*** -0.0399*** -0.0781*** 
   (0.00698) (0.00739) (0.00739) (0.00765) 
female   -0.291*** -0.237*** -0.237*** -0.238*** 
   (0.00309) (0.00318) (0.00318) (0.00315) 
married   0.183*** 0.139*** 0.139*** 0.142*** 
   (0.00184) (0.00193) (0.00193) (0.00192) 
NEast    0.0178*** 0.0178*** 0.114*** 
    (0.00283) (0.00283) (0.0169) 
MWest   -0.108*** -0.0878*** -0.0878*** -0.0586*** 
   (0.00249) (0.00255) (0.00255) (0.0193) 
South   -0.0853*** -0.0653*** -0.0653*** -0.00343 
   (0.00230) (0.00225) (0.00225) (0.0140) 
o.West    - - - 
       
o.LessThanHS    - - - 
       
HSgrad   -0.680*** 0.109*** 0.109*** 0.111*** 
   (0.00307) (0.00498) (0.00498) (0.00497) 
SomeCollege   -0.547*** 0.218*** 0.218*** 0.217*** 
   (0.00296) (0.00495) (0.00495) (0.00494) 
College   -0.259*** 0.489*** 0.489*** 0.485*** 
   (0.00334) (0.00533) (0.00533) (0.00531) 
PostGrad    0.768*** 0.768*** 0.756*** 
    (0.00572) (0.00572) (0.00571) 
_Iyear_2000   0.266*** -0.213*** -0.213*** -0.218*** 
   (0.00130) (0.00342) (0.00342) (0.00339) 
_Iyear_2001   0.296*** -0.189*** -0.189*** -0.193*** 
   (0.00357) (0.00468) (0.00468) (0.00465) 
_Iyear_2002   0.323*** -0.158*** -0.158*** -0.162*** 
   (0.00391) (0.00490) (0.00490) (0.00486) 
_Iyear_2003   0.333*** -0.153*** -0.153*** -0.156*** 
   (0.00397) (0.00490) (0.00490) (0.00487) 
_Iyear_2004   0.355*** -0.128*** -0.128*** -0.130*** 
   (0.00404) (0.00496) (0.00496) (0.00493) 
















   (0.00290) (0.00413) (0.00413) (0.00410) 
_Iyear_2006   0.408*** -0.0777*** -0.0777*** -0.0799*** 
   (0.00271) (0.00401) (0.00401) (0.00398) 
_Iyear_2007   0.447*** -0.0382*** -0.0382*** -0.0397*** 
   (0.00278) (0.00405) (0.00405) (0.00402) 
_Iyear_2008   0.454*** -0.0279*** -0.0279*** -0.0287*** 
   (0.00283) (0.00408) (0.00408) (0.00405) 
_Iyear_2009   0.470*** -0.0107*** -0.0107*** -0.0124*** 
   (0.00293) (0.00411) (0.00411) (0.00408) 
_Iyear_2010   0.475*** -0.0101** -0.0101** -0.0110*** 
   (0.00304) (0.00418) (0.00418) (0.00414) 
_Iyear_2011   0.481*** -0.00705 -0.00705 -0.00704 
   (0.00345) (0.00444) (0.00444) (0.00440) 
o._Iyear_2012    - - - 
       
Industry FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
       
State FE No No No No No Yes 
       
Constant   4.809*** 4.412*** 4.412*** 4.320*** 
   (0.0131) (0.0251) (0.0251) (0.0280) 
       
Observations   2,374,029 1,520,105 1,520,105 1,520,105 
R-squared   0.201 0.264 0.264 0.274 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
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